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Abstract 
When consumers choose to abstain from purchasing meat, they face some uncertainty about 
whether their decisions will have an impact on the number of animals raised and killed. 
Consequentialists have argued that this uncertainty should not dissuade consumers from a 
vegetarian diet because the “expected” impact, or average impact, will be predictable. Recently, 
however, critics have argued that the expected marginal impact of a consumer change is likely to 
be much smaller or more radically unpredictable than previously thought. This objection to the 
consequentialist case for vegetarianism is known as the “causal inefficacy” (or “causal 
impotence”) objection. In this paper, we argue that the inefficacy objection fails. First, we 
summarize the contours of the objection and the standard “expected impact” response to it. Second, 
we examine and rebut two contemporary attempts (by Mark Budolfson and Ted Warfield) to defeat 
the expected impact reply through alleged demonstrations of the inefficacy of abstaining from 
meat consumption. Third, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that single individual 
consumers—not just individual consumers taken as an aggregate—really do make a positive 
difference when they choose to abstain from meat consumption. Our case rests on three economic 
observations: (i) animal producers operate in a highly competitive environment, (ii) complex 
supply chains efficiently communicate some information about product demand, and (iii) 
consumers of plant-based meat alternatives have positive consumption spillover effects on other 
consumers.  
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0. Introduction 
One common argument against meat consumption rests on the belief that consuming meat 
causes unnecessary animal suffering. Though most consumers do not personally inflict the 
suffering in question themselves, the thought is that their consumption causes others—particularly 
modern industrial meat producers—to inflict the suffering on behalf of consumers, responding 
directly to the demand for animal products that consumer choices create. If this animal suffering 
is morally significant, and if consumers could avoid causing it by choosing from among many 
cost- and nutrition-equivalent plant-based alternatives, then a consequentialist may argue that 
people should stop consuming meat and eat a plant-based diet instead. Peter Singer made this 
argument famous in publishing Animal Liberation in 1975 (Singer 2009), and it has been a 
standard part of the intellectual basis for vegetarian and vegan diets ever since. Many critics have 
challenged this argument, however, by contesting the alleged causal connection between 
individual acts of meat consumption and animal suffering. If, because of the size and complexity 
of agricultural markets, purchasing one additional serving of meat does not increase the total 
amount of future animal suffering, such critics maintain, then there is little reason for the strict 
consequentialist to abstain.  
      This objection to Singer’s classic articulation of the consequentialist case for vegetarianism 
is known as the “causal inefficacy” (or “causal impotence”) objection. In this paper, we argue that 
the inefficacy objection fails. We build our case in three steps. First, we briefly summarize the 
basic contours of the objection and the standard “expected impact” response, and explain why it 
matters, both in the lives of everyday moral agents and in the philosophical literature. Second, we 
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examine and criticize two contemporary attempts to defeat the expected impact reply through 
alleged demonstrations of causal inefficacy. Third, we argue that there are good reasons to believe 
that single individual consumers—not just individual consumers taken as an aggregate—really do 
make a positive difference when they choose to abstain from meat consumption. 
 Our guiding insight, more specifically, is that the causal inefficacy objection, in each of 
the versions we consider, is grounded on false assumptions about how the economy operates. 
Critics observe the size and complexity of agricultural markets and conclude that individual action 
does not have a unique discernable impact. However, this conclusion simply doesn’t follow from 
any standard models of how these markets actually work, or from the empirical evidence that we 
have about producer responsiveness in notoriously competitive animal agricultural markets. We 
argue that an accurate description of how these supply chains function results in considerable 
certainty about the long run expected (or average) impact of a marginal change in individual 
consumption habits. We maintain, in summary, that agricultural markets and supply chains are in 
fact responsive in predictable and often measurable ways to changes in consumer purchasing 
decisions, and that this responsiveness warrants consumer confidence, contra the causal inefficacy 
objection, that abstaining from meat consumption does in fact make a positive difference.  
 Before we proceed, we should clarify two important points about our use of the term “meat 
consumption” in this context. First, in using the term “consumption,” we are concerned to pick out 
consumer behaviors, i.e., behaviors that engage markets, like purchasing meat directly from a store 
or restaurant or eating meat that one has paid for indirectly through an institutional meal plan. In 
the vast majority of cases for individual consumers, meat purchasing goes hand-in-hand with meat 
eating even though purchasing and eating can and do come apart, as when—for instance—one 
buys meat for someone else’s dinner or one eats meat that one has hunted, scavenged, or received 
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as a gift. In this paper, we set aside instances of meat eating (such as freeganism, scavenging, 
hunting, and the ingestion of gifted foods) that do not involve consumer engagement with markets. 
Second, in using the term “meat,” we take a broad interpretation that includes the vast majority of 
dairy products and eggs as well, insofar as the markets for these products function in the same 
ways and raise the same moral concerns about the causation of unnecessary animal suffering.1  
 
1. The Causal Inefficacy Objection and the Expected Impact Response  
The basic idea behind the causal inefficacy objection is that the expected impact of 
individual consumer choices diminishes as the supply chain becomes longer and more complex.2 
For example, in a small-scale economy, there is a clear connection between a person’s decision to 
consume meat and the life and death of an animal. A self-sufficient person, raising their own 
chickens, would kill the chicken only when they intended to consume it. Similarly, in an economy 
of a few hundred people supported by one or two chicken farmers, if one household stopped 
purchasing chickens, the farmers could easily see the change in buying habits and adjust their 
breeding accordingly.  
Early critics of Singer’s consequentialist argument against animal consumption argued that 
this simple vision of the economy is not realistic. Frey (1985, chap. 17) and Martin (M. Martin 
1976) both point to the fact that, in a large complex market, customers cannot know if their 
                                                        
1 For discussions of moral concerns about eggs and dairy products and their connections to the 
meat industry, see Jones and Gruen (2015), Hooley and Nobis (2015), and McPherson (2015).  
2 For an accessible overview of the basic idea as articulated by one of this objection’s most 
influential contemporary proponents, see Mark Bryant Budolfson (2015). 
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purchases have an impact. According to their argument, as the market gets larger, and the distance 
between consumers and farmers grows, the causal link between consumer choices and animal 
breeding/slaughter becomes less clear. A consumer’s choice to abstain from meat consumption 
must affect the choices of the grocer, the wholesaler, and the producer, at minimum, before 
reaching the farmer. As the argument goes, if the purchase of a chicken does not change the 
purchasing behavior of the grocery store, then the orders down the supply chain will not change, 
and there will be no impact on animals. In fact, if, at any point in the supply chain, the impact of 
the consumers’ choice is not substantial enough to cause a corresponding reduction in purchases, 
there will be no impact on animal lives. To these critics, the probability of having an impact on 
actual animal lives is vanishingly small. If this is the case, then the choice to abstain from meat 
consumption makes little difference, and the moral motivation for vegetarianism—reducing 
animal suffering and death—is undercut, at least from within a consequentialist frame of 
reference.3  
 This objection does have a certain intuitive power, and not just over professional ethicists. 
Who among us has not rationalized that a dubious action we are about to take doesn’t really matter 
in the end? And on the flipside, who among us has not experienced disappointment—maybe even 
despair and flagging commitment—as we worry that our best efforts to ameliorate some 
entrenched social problem ultimately come to nothing?  In our experience, the causal inefficacy 
                                                        
3 According to some proponents, not just consequentialist prohibitions of meat consumption are in 
trouble. Deontological arguments are potentially compromised too insofar as they often employ 
familiar conceptions of complicity with evil or wrongdoing to explain why abstention from meat 
consumption is still morally required, as a rule, even though it doesn’t discernibly reduce any 
suffering. See Mark Bryant Budolfson (2017). 
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objection is, for many people, a lived-experiential obstacle to considering, much less taking up and 
sustaining, a commitment to vegetarianism. 
The strong intuitive pull of this objection shows up in the philosophical literature in a 
curious way: while just a few ethicists have attempted to substantiate the alleged causal inefficacy 
of abstaining from meat consumption as a genuine economic phenomenon, many ethicists simply 
take it for granted that the objection works (at least for the sake of argument) before moving on to 
consider other, presumably more compelling arguments against buying and eating meat. This 
effort to move “beyond difference-making,” as Elizabeth Harman describes the strategy, is 
increasingly common in the recent literature (2015). After declaring the causal inefficacy objection 
a “serious worry,” Harman turns to considering, among other things, whether meat consumption 
is morally wrong because the consumer participates “as a joint-cause in an act of harming” even 
though her individual choice is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the harm in question. 
Garvey argues that we have an obligation to act in ways that are environmentally-friendly, even if 
we have no tangible impact (2011). Chignell considers whether purchasing meat can be morally 
differentiated from opportunistically consuming discarded meat given the industry’s purported 
insensitivity to demand changes (2015). Finally, Martin (2015) develops an account that locates 
the wrongness of consuming industrially farmed meat in one’s complicity in the collective acts of 
a consumer group “that has the function of signaling demand” for meat “regardless of her actual 
causal contribution to [these acts].”  
      The picture that emerges, it seems to us, is that the causal inefficacy objection is ripe for 
further investigation at the level of the economic assumptions that underlie it. We think there’s a 
fair amount at stake for this investigation, too. After all, we are considering an objection that gets 
a lot of intuitive traction with people at the ground level, makes detailed empirical claims about 
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how agricultural markets work, has proponents who contend that these claims undercut the most 
influential arguments against meat consumption of the last four decades, and is frequently 
considered a serious objection by influential philosophers who are moved, at least in part by the 
force of this objection, to explore other non-difference-making prospects for arguing against meat 
consumption. 
We are sympathetic to the view that there are compelling ways to argue against meat 
consumption without presuming that individual acts of consumption are difference-making.4 
Indeed, the development of some of these compelling new arguments has been quite fruitful. 
However, we think that the consequentialist argument is stronger than the literature suggests, and 
that a closer look at agricultural supply chains reveals that individual consumer choice still packs 
a significant causal punch. The real and potentially measurable effects on animal lives that result 
from our actions should thus remain a central part of how we morally evaluate our choices, even 
though there are other good arguments against meat consumption.  
The standard reply to the causal inefficacy objection is the “expected impact” argument 
(Matheny 2002; Norcross 2004; Singer 2009; Kagan 2011), according to which any particular 
chicken purchase may not cause the grocer to increase or decrease the number of chickens that she 
orders from the wholesaler, but there will be some “threshold chicken” that causes a shift in 
ordering. For example, a grocery store may choose to order chickens in batches of 10, and thus 
wait until 10 chickens have been purchased before ordering more. In this way of thinking, the first 
                                                        
4 In an unpublished manuscript, Robert Jones canvasses a variety of these strategies, including 
those offered by Harman and Martin, and combines them with his own account of “political 
veganism,” arguing that “these solutions can, in concert, answer the challenge [of the causal 
inefficacy objection].” The paper draws heavily on Gruen and Jones (2015). 
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nine customers do not have a direct effect, but the tenth customer causes the purchase of 10 
chickens when they purchase one. Similarly, any particular grocery store order from the wholesale 
supplier may not change the number of chickens the wholesaler purchases from the producer, but 
there will be a threshold at which the wholesaler will alter its buying habits as well.  
Each consumer choice thus has a probabilistic impact: there is some probability that their 
choice will occur on the threshold and have a large effect, and some probability that it will not be 
on the threshold and have no immediate effect. Because these thresholds are not knowable to the 
customer, they will have to evaluate the effect of their purchasing in terms of the “expected 
impact.” The expected impact here would mean the probability of being on the threshold times the 
size of the threshold impact. If chickens are ordered in batches of 50, and every 50th purchase spurs 
another order, then the probability of being on a threshold is 1/50 and the impact of a choice at the 
threshold is 50 chickens. In this case, the expected impact of purchasing a chicken is one chicken 
death.  Adding more layers into the supply chain does not change the nature of the problem, but 
merely adds more probabilities and effect sizes to calculate. In this threshold setup, lower 
probabilities will correspond to higher effect sizes, so that the expected impact is usually similar 
to the impact of a purchase in a less complicated system with less uncertainty. Because the 
language of the expected impact argument, in terms of thresholds and probabilities, has become 
standard in the literature, we will use it through much of the paper. In section 3, however, we will 
propose a different way of thinking about consumer efficacy. 
Frey has criticized the expected impact response, correctly pointing out that it leaves most 
consumers, in most cases, having no effect, and a few consumers having a large effect (Frey 1985, 
214). The effect of any particular consumer action is thus uncertain, and even the probability of 
having this type of an effect is likely unknowable for most consumers in most situations. That said, 
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it is common to push this criticism too far. Frey’s ultimate argument lies in the intuition, shared 
by Martin, that in a large market, the overall effects of consumer action are unknowable. There is 
a difference, however, between uncertainty regarding the effect of a particular choice, and 
uncertainty about the effect of such choices on average. To justify any conclusions about the 
effectiveness of choices overall requires that one say something about how the economy functions, 
which Frey does not. It is theoretically possible to have an economy that is both large and 
responsive, or small and unresponsive, depending on the nature of the relationships between the 
consumer and the supplier.  
The two versions of the inefficacy argument that we consider in detail here take up this 
task of attempting to provide an explanation of how the nature of the economy defeats 
consequentialist accounts of consumer efficacy: 
a.   The “Too Insulated” Defeater—Mark Budolfson maintains that it is normal for 
agricultural production and distribution to include buffers that prevent marginal changes 
from altering their production decisions. (Budolfson 2018)  
b.   The “Too Complicated” Defeater—Ted A. Warfield points to the complexity of the 
economy, arguing that simple stories of cause and effect are impossible (Warfield 2015).  
 
While these arguments are quite different in their particulars, they share a common form. Each 
posits some characteristic of the economy that ostensibly precludes a predictable market response 
to a change in the purchasing habits of an individual person. While only Budolfson frames his 
argument in the terms of this question, both of these authors conclude that individuals do not have 
a clear moral obligation to abstain from meat consumption. 
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Our case against these versions of the inefficacy objection has both critical and constructive 
components. In section 2 we summarize each version of the objection and critically evaluate the 
reasons offered for believing that the market is not responsive; in both cases, we deem the reasons 
unpersuasive. In section 3 we conclude with a separate constructive argument for believing that 
the market is, in fact, responsive to individual changes in consumer behavior. 
2.a. Budolfson: Producer Responsiveness to Changes in Sales 
The heart of arguments about consumer efficacy regarding animal agriculture can be 
framed as an empirical question: What impact does the purchase of a chicken have on levels of 
production in the poultry industry? The answer depends on the way in which firms respond to 
consumer spending. Budolfson makes a multi-part argument against consumer efficacy in these 
terms. First, he makes a broad claim that consequentialist arguments against purchasing meat are 
contingent on the assumption that the economic system will translate consumer choices into 
changes in animal agricultural production. The fact that this moral claim is contingent on economic 
circumstances means that the consequentialist case is context-specific in an important way that 
proponents have rarely acknowledged. Second, Budolfson makes the case that in the particular 
context of industrial animal agriculture in North America, individual meat purchases are very 
likely not going to have an impact on production--an argument he supports with an account of how 
these markets function. We agree with the broad premise of Budolfson’s important work: claims 
of consumer causal efficacy are economically contingent. We contend, however, that industrial 
animal agriculture in North America is highly responsive to consumer decisions, and thus the 
standard consequentialist arguments against meat eating actually do apply. 
To support his empirically-sensitive argument that individual instances of meat 
consumption are typically non-difference-making in the North American context, Budolfson 
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argues that we can observe enough waste and “slack” in the supply chain to know that any given 
chicken purchase is not near a relevant threshold (Budolfson 2018). If a person is facing a decision 
with this kind of uncertainty, and they have good information about the probability of being near 
a threshold, this can dramatically alter the expected impact calculation. Budolfson often considers, 
by analogy, the question of whether or not a person should vote. In the U.S. system, if a voter 
knows – from history, news reports, and polling – that a candidate is very likely to win their state 
by a wide margin, their expected impact from voting is going to be much smaller than a person 
voting in a close contest. Similarly, if a person knew that their purchase of a chicken was not near 
the threshold, they could, he argues, purchase the chicken without worry about consequences for 
animals. 
Budolfson is correct in claiming that expected impact calculations cannot always assume 
that an action, on the margin, would be the same as the average effect of many such actions. The 
standard expected utility response given by Singer and Kagan can depend crucially on the kind of 
information that a person has about the location of thresholds. For this reason, it is worth examining 
the kind of relevant information that Budolfson thinks a meat purchaser can have. The guiding 
example he develops to illustrate his primary argument is that of “buffers” built into the supply 
chain for animal products at every level. A certain amount of meat is “wasted” if it is not purchased 
before the expiration date at the wholesale level and at the supermarket. Excess meat is sometimes 
sold to producers of pet food or other animal feed. Budolfson concludes: 
[T]he crucial issue is not about the magnitude of these buffers, but rather about their 
reliability: as long as we can know – as we can – that there are sure to be buffers of non-
trivial size throughout the supply … that reduces the probability of a single individual 
making a difference to a level that quickly becomes nearly infinitesimal, in a way that is 
analogous to the way that mathematical models explain why the probability of casting a 
decisive vote in a large-scale election quickly becomes nearly infinitesimal when it is 
assumed that individuals have very reliable information that one candidate has a non-
trivial lead over the others (Budolfson 2018).   
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The existence of these “buffers,” in general, is not disputable. Building some buffers into 
a supply chain is the standard way to deal with uncertainty at both sides of a market (Lapide 2008). 
Buffers are designed as intentional “slack” in the system, so that if consumers decided to purchase 
more or less than expected, or if production goes slower than expected, there are extra goods 
available and other uses for goods that remain unsold. However, the fact that food is wasted or 
held in reserve in these ways simply does not tell the consumer anything about whether she is near 
a threshold. In fact, it is not clear why the existence of buffers provides any relevant information 
that makes the situation different from the straightforward cases described by Singer and Kagan. 
To understand why we will consider two scenarios in turn, each giving different ways these buffers 
could be related to a production decision threshold.  
First, it is possible that some amount of these buffers has to be “used up” or get very large 
before production will increase or decrease. For example, an egg producer might find that it is 
cheaper to stock a local warehouse all at once each week, and only restock when the warehouse is 
almost empty. In this case, consumers would have to purchase a warehouse full of eggs before a 
new restocking order was made. If this is the case, then the buffers are just functioning as part of 
the threshold framework described by Singer and Kagan. The number of eggs in a warehouse 
shipment would be the size of the threshold that needed to be overcome. 
           Alternatively, it is also possible that some buffer is a constant part of the system, and will 
not change in response to consumer choices. This is particularly likely with food waste. There is 
some imprecision in production and shipping that is just too expensive to eliminate. For example, 
there might be a potential electronic system that would track chicken age, location, and quality, 
and thus minimize waste, but if that system cost the firm more money than it would save, firms 
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might choose to dispose of some chickens rather than track them more precisely. This kind of 
waste would be present in the system whether demand was high or low, and might exist at all 
levels of the supply chain. Note that a consumer decision to consume one more or one less chicken 
will not have any effect on this kind of waste – the waste would be exactly the same regardless of 
consumer choices. The key question is whether knowledge of the mere existence of such waste 
provides any information to a consumer. We contend that it does not, unless the consumer knows 
that a particular animal product has already been discarded.5 The mere knowledge that there is 
waste in the system overall, or even that there is waste at one’s particular supermarket, does not 
give the customer any information about whether their purchase will influence the retailer to order 
more or fewer products. Similarly, the knowledge that buffers exist does not tell a consumer 
anything about their location relative to those buffers. It is quite possible that wasted meat in your 
supermarket gives the consumer information that their producer is near the threshold, since their 
normal purchasing pattern could have been excessive. The normal case, however, is that 
consumers know little to nothing about the distance to a threshold at their particular retailer, and 
even less further down the supply chain. 
 Note that this situation is very different than the case of a voter who lives in a state 
dominated by one political party in a winner-take-all presidential race. In the election example, it 
is quite plausible that a voter would have some good information about the plausibility of their 
vote making a difference. Some voters would know that their vote was unlikely to change the race 
outcome, and other voters, in “swing states” would know that their vote was much more likely to 
make a difference. The chicken consumer, however, does not have analogous information. 
                                                        
5 It is common for consequentialist ethicists to make exceptions for "freegan" or discarded animal 
products, since these are already outside the system of production. 
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Because consumers rarely know what is going on in their own grocery store, much less in the 
longer supply chain, neither those near nor far from the threshold are likely to have this kind of 
knowledge. 
The efficiency of supply chains will be addressed at greater length later in this paper, but 
it is worth noting that there is good reason to believe that the “buffers” that exist in the system will 
be as small as possible and will exist independent of the thresholds. Profit margins in agriculture 
and food retail  are quite low (Damodaran 2018). Moreover, animals are bred for very particular 
markets. This means that when a producer or retailer sells excess unpurchased broilers to a dog-
food producer, they are cutting losses. No producer can consistently “waste” products in this 
manner without going out of business. Stated alternatively, these markets are competitive, and 
competition between farmers, distributors, and retailers will force these buffers to be as small, and 
waste as uncommon, as is financially possible.6  
A second element of Budolfson’s argument is that there are many different factors that 
influence farmers decision-making in addition to prices and purchasing. For example, he argues 
that the price of feed, the condition of their land, the price of other inputs, the availability of grazing 
permits, and transportation costs are all more important than the final selling price of the animals 
in determining herd size for a particular rancher or flock size for a particular chicken grower 
                                                        
6 As evidence for this characterization, note that the movement toward “lean” supply chains, 
particularly in food production, has focused, particularly on ways to reduce waste in the supply 
chain (Mena et al. 2014). The increased efficiency of these systems has been well documented, 
and is the primary cause of the extraordinary concentration of meat production (Azzam 1997; 
Martinez 1999; Martinez 2002; The Pew Environment Group 2013a), as well as agriculture 
markets more broadly (Carillo et al. 2016). 
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(Budolfson 2018). In this he echoes a similar argument made by Nefsky (2011). He notes that most 
ranchers and growers will raise as many animals as their infrastructure supports, regardless of the 
price. In economic terms, he is making an argument for inelastic supply at the level of a particular 
producer.  
This characterization of how agricultural markets work is not well grounded. First, it is 
worth noting that the sheer number of moving variables that impact farmers’ decision-making tells 
us nothing about the impact of consumer purchasing decisions. While there are many variables 
that affect the profitability of animal agriculture, the profitability of a farm is always jointly 
determined by costs and revenue, which will always depend on prices. Moreover, the fact that 
production costs change all the time actually undermines Budolfson’s main argument – that 
consumers can know something about whether they are operating near a threshold. Since the 
threshold for production decisions is a moving target, determined jointly by prices and costs, it is 
essentially unknowable for the consumer. 
Second, the observation that most farmers will produce as many animals as their 
land/facilities will sustainably support is exactly what would be expected in a competitive industry. 
Individual firms, as price-takers, are extremely unresponsive, in the short run, to changes in price. 
This, however, does not mean that the market is not responsive. When demand for chickens drops, 
the result is not that a particular farmer chooses to hatch one less chicken. Instead, the threshold-
triggered event is a particular grower’s failure to get a contract to raise birds at all, or a delay in 
the next shipment of birds, a switch to a different type of agriculture, or a rancher’s choice to sell 
her land to a developer. In the very short run, producers can make small changes to their production 
 
 
16 
costs and output,7 but the real response that matters is the long-run effect, which in this case would 
be a period of time somewhere between 6 months and a year. Standard economic models of these 
industries would predict that in the long run, a competitive market will be much more responsive 
than in the short run.  
The important thing to see here is that most suppliers do not change their behavior in 
response to a price drop, but rather absorb the losses and keep going. The producers that will 
respond are those on the margin, with the best outside options or the least competitive position in 
the market. These marginal producers are the ones that will leave the industry in response to lower 
prices. In a large industry, moreover, competition will always drive the price to the point where 
the marginal producer is right on the edge of non-participation in the market.8 Even in industries 
                                                        
7 For an example of an agriculture publication describing short-run market responses to changes 
in final sale prices and feed prices see: Lawrence et al. (2008). 
8 A basic description of the model being described here is available in most introductory 
microeconomics texts in the chapter(s) describing competitive industries, although it would also 
be a fair description of monopolistically competitive industries, or other models in which there are 
a large number of suppliers of similar goods Tomek and Kaiser (2014) give this application of the 
model particularly good treatment. This kind of market is one in which each individual farmer has 
little to no power over the price of their goods (as with agriculture) and will thus produce the most 
profitable quantity at the going price. This kind of industry is responsive precisely because of the 
low profit margins of individual farmers (The Pew Environment Group 2013a). Not only are 
chicken growers and other producers often making little money per chicken or per hour of labor, 
they also have an opportunity cost associated with their land, equipment and time that makes the 
“economic profit” associated with their business even lower than the low reported profits that show 
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that are vertically integrated, like the market for chickens, “growers” often operate with heavy 
debt, barely above poverty, and parent firms give them only short-term contracts (J. MacDonald 
2008). A drop in demand can easily leave them without a contract for a season, or with a delay 
between shipments of birds (The Pew Environment Group 2013b). 
It is important to note that this argument does not depend on a frictionless economy with 
perfect information in which every consumer action results in a price change and a production 
change. On the contrary, the expected impact argument that comes out of the threshold framework 
explicitly takes into account the uncertainty attached to the impact of any particular consumer 
decision. While each consumer choice moves the market toward or away from a particular 
threshold, the threshold-triggering action is the producer change described here. What is important 
about this competitive industry argument is that it gives us good reason to believe that producers 
will be responsive to changes in prices. Indeed, there will be a strong incentive for firms and 
industries to be as responsive as they possibly can.  
The picture that emerges from economic studies of these types of markets is one in which, 
despite the scale involved, individual consumer actions are reliably, if probabilistically, translated 
into changes in the quantity supplied to the market. As Budolfson argues, there are ways in which 
agricultural markets could be organized that would make them resistant to changes in consumer 
choices. For example, if the government implemented price controls, and promised to buy excess 
demand from farmers, then farmers could continue producing as demand falls (Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman 1986). These types of policies have been historically common in agricultural policy, 
but have been largely abandoned over the last twenty years. Moreover, even under these programs, 
                                                        
up in their annual accounting. In this scenario, a small drop in price or a slower rate of flock 
deliveries easily hit the tipping point for those farmers on the margin. 
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responses to consumer choices were only delayed, since the subsidies acted as a system for 
smoothing out volatility, rather than expanding the market. 
2.b. Warfield: Economic Complexity 
 Warfield’s argument starts with the premise that the economy is so complex that causal 
outcomes over long supply chains are unpredictable. Warfield’s “phone bill argument,” for 
example, notes that the purchase of meat is similar to paying a phone bill (2015). When you 
purchase a chicken, some small fraction of your money may support a factory farm that 
inhumanely raises chickens. Similarly, when you pay your phone bill, if employees at the phone 
company eat chicken, some small fraction of your money may support a factory farm. In short, he 
argues that in a complex economy, it is impossible to avoid some economic connection to factory 
farming. This argument depends on a very different kind of economic uncertainty than does 
Budolfson’s scenario, but the result of the critique for consequentialist arguments about consumer 
action are similar. The response to both, moreover, depends on an “expected impact” argument, 
since consumer omniscience is impossible. 
 The implication is that any argument against meat purchasing must be able to distinguish 
between the causal connections that tie both the chicken purchase and the phone bill to the 
industrial farm. Warfield notes that a consequentialist cannot differentiate between these events 
by examining the intent of the agent, since the morality of the action needs to depend only on the 
results. More broadly, Warfield calls for a broad consideration of possible impacts. He notes that 
there could be feedback mechanisms in the economy, such that decreased consumption by one 
person resulted in increased consumption by another. In particular as one group of people 
consumes less meat, this could lower the price of meat, thereby encouraging others to consume 
more (Warfield 2015, 159). The picture he paints is of an economy with so many connections that 
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a devoted vegan or vegetarian could not avoid complicity in animal harm, no matter how strict 
they were about avoiding animal products. 
 Warfield does not make any strong claims about the economy. His strategy, instead, is to 
express a general lack of confidence in a person’s ability to present any simple causal story. He 
argues that the complexity of economic interactions requires one of two responses. Either ethicists 
give up on causal stories about how consumer actions impact production, or else we give reasons 
why an action like buying meat has a particular set of consequences that are unique in quality or 
magnitude.  
Responding to Warfield requires that we first concede part of his argument: the economy 
is extremely complex and most economic transactions could, therefore, be connected to animal 
agriculture. Usually, however, these connections are trivial. Since most purchases result in income 
for some other person, and most people consume at least some meat from factory farms, economic 
purity is impossible. This is an important ethical observation. If one’s ethical intuition is that a 
person who buys chicken once a month and a person who buys chicken once each day are morally 
similar, then Warfield’s argument compellingly reminds us that in our economic system, even the 
most devoted vegan could be in that once-a-month category. 
For a consequentialist, however, the magnitude of the impact does matter, and Warfield’s 
argument does not prevent us from making important distinctions. There is good reason to believe, 
for example, that purchasing a chicken has a much larger impact on the chicken industry than does 
paying a phone bill. Moreover, paying a phone bill probably has a negligible effect on the chicken 
industry, similar to that of a toothbrush purchase, or the purchase of any other unrelated good. If 
we choose to participate in a modern economy, in fact, this kind of second-order involvement with 
animal agriculture is unavoidable. In light of this, we can rephrase the argument against meat-
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buying in the following way: it is unethical to purchase meat because the expected impact of a 
meat purchase on animal well-being is worse than any other comparable purchase.  
This alternative phrasing of the argument requires making an empirical claim, but 
importantly, many of the effects that Warfield thinks might be relevant are empirical in nature, and 
can be measured using standard economic data. In order to respond to Warfield’s skepticism, 
however, we must make a distinction between what is observable on average, and what is 
observable in a particular case. It is impossible to know, with certainty, whether one is materially 
supporting an industrial farm when one pays a phone bill. However, we can tell whether, on 
average, paying a phone bill results in more money for industrial farms. This unpredictability at 
the individual level should not dissuade us from consequentialist reasoning, for two reasons. First, 
noise at the level of an individual observation is perfectly consistent with strong causal effects 
overall. Imagine trying to measure the height of water in a bucket before and after dipping a cup 
in and removing some of the water. The ripples from the disturbance make any depth measurement 
at a particular place and time highly uncertain, and the complexity of the wave patterns make each 
measurement difficult to predict. However, the average outcome will still be easily predictable and 
causally related to the amount of water removed. Second, the standard “expected impact” argument 
for abstaining from meat requires only that the average impact is predictable. This means that 
economic complexity, as long as it conforms to a broader predictable order, is not a challenge to 
consequentialist moral reasoning. 
As a simple example, we will give some evidence that the effect of an unrelated purchase 
(like a phone bill) is trivial compared to the actual purchase of a chicken. Let us assume that a 
customer has $100 to use as they wish, and are interested in comparing the impact of two different 
purchases on animal lives. If the money is spent paying a phone bill, about $75 will likely end up 
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as wages for a worker.9 Moreover, in the United States, roughly 2% of new income is spent on 
food,10 and for every 1% increase in food expenditures, the average household spends 0.04% more 
money on meat and eggs (Alston and Okrent 2012, 20). Given aggregate food consumption 
statistics,11 this means that, on average, $100 spent on a phone bill results in close to 1.6 cents 
more money spent on meat and eggs.12 Spending that $100 on chicken will have a similar indirect 
effect, but this effect is negligible. The point is, that even without figuring out the impact of 
spending on actual production levels, we can estimate that the phone bill expense has a total impact 
on factory farming that is four orders of magnitude smaller than the same expenditure on chicken. 
                                                        
9 The share of national income that goes to labor varies over time, between 70 and 85% (Bivens 
2015). 
10 Food consumption expenditures increase only a small amount as people become richer  (Regmi 
and Seale 2010, 11). 
11 The average household income in the U.S. is around $50,000, and people in the U.S. spend close 
to 11% of their income on food, on average, and 2.88% on meat and eggs. While these studies are 
methodologically sound, they are not the most generous numbers in the literature. Even if we 
search for estimates most damaging to our argument, however, it is difficult to find estimates of 
new meat spending from a $100 increase in income above $3.45, leading to the result that buying 
$100 worth of chicken has an effect 28 times bigger than spending that money on other purchases.  
12 The relevant calculations: !.!#×$&'$''!!! = 0.027% increase in food consumption, 0.027 × 0.04 =0.00108% increase in meat and egg spending, and finally, . 0000108× $50000 × 0.0288 =1.55 cents of new spending on meat and eggs. 
 
 
22 
Clearly, consequentialist considerations should focus on the chicken purchase, and not the phone 
bill.  
What this calculation really indicates, however, is that while the economy is extremely 
complex, that complexity does not result in uninterpretable chaos. The secondary effects of 
spending that result from connections between markets only tend to be strong when there is a well-
established link between the two industries. Thus, when two goods are clearly competitors in the 
same market, or when two goods are both produced from the same natural resource, their sales and 
production tend to be related. In most cases, however, we can safely ignore the “phone bill 
problem” because the relationship between the telephone market and the market for chickens is so 
weak. Stated positively, it means that we can make moral arguments about the impact of consumer 
decisions in a meaningful way, even within a complex economy. 
3. Efficient Responsive Supply Chains and Causal Efficacy 
 In this final section, we briefly sketch the contours of a positive argument for consumer 
efficacy. In this section, we are not directly responding to arguments from the authors we engage 
above, and so there may be some agreement on these points. Our argument has three parts.  First, 
we argue, adopting the “threshold” framework, that there are good economic reasons to believe 
that long and complex supply chains, in general, will be responsive to consumers. Second, we will 
argue that the threshold framework can be misleading, particularly when consumer choices are 
compared to voting. Finally, we will argue that there are at least three positive-feedback 
mechanisms operating in the economy that make consumer decisions more effective than we might 
otherwise expect. 
First, the responsiveness of agricultural markets can seem counter-intuitive absent an 
appreciation for the nature of modern supply chains. The long and complicated supply chains that 
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connect individual farmers to consumers are actually designed to be more responsive and more 
reliable than shorter, more local relationships. For example, modern grocery stores have check-out 
procedures that track the sale of each product and automatically order replacements from the parent 
companies. Even in industries that are not vertically integrated, standard information technology 
allows firms to track sales in great detail, down to individual transactions (Salin 2000). In addition, 
these companies track the rates of orders to optimize shipping and refrigeration times and to 
minimize waste. Perhaps surprisingly, there is less waste among large centralized distributors than 
among smaller, more “local” operations because the large distributors are able to serve numerous 
grocery stores with millions of consumers. In this kind of system, the large distributors that 
contract with farms actually do know the rate at which chickens are being purchased throughout 
their network. This efficient supply-chain technology actually should alleviate some causal 
inefficacy concerns, particularly in those cases when the size and complexity of markets is the 
impetus for the inefficacy objection. While it is common to assume that smaller, local markets will 
be more responsive, there is a wealth of evidence that the vertically-integrated agribusiness 
oligopolies are the most able to respond to individual changes in consumer demand (Albanese 
2015).  
 If this description of the system still seems implausible, note that large food distribution 
systems have become the norm precisely because of their efficiency (Martinez 1999; Martinez 
2002). Even among operating farms, the larger integrated farms have lower costs overall. One recent study 
found, for example, that largest farms face costs per unit that are 60% of what the smaller farms face 
(McBride and Key 2007; J. M. MacDonald and McBride 2009). All of the incentives in the system, as 
perverse as they may be with regard to animal well-being, push producers to be as responsive as 
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is profitable to changes in consumer demand, and to reduce waste.13 More responsiveness to 
consumers, if it can be done at reasonable cost, will only improve profitability. This means that 
those who argue that the supply chain is not responsive to customers are in the odd position of 
claiming that these firms are not sensitive enough to the profit motive, which is a difficult position 
to defend. 
 Given this description of the way these markets function, we can now describe the causal 
chain that connects an individual’s purchase to a farmer’s production decision. When a person 
decides to stop purchasing chickens, the result is that their local grocery store automatically starts 
ordering chickens more slowly, to reflect the decreased rate of sale. The distributor (perhaps 
Chickens R Us) will automatically adjust their shipments of chickens to that store. Since some 
shipments will require preset bundles of chickens, there will be a threshold at which a delivery of 
meat comes a day later, to reflect the slower demand. This “threshold” does not mean, however 
                                                        
13 It will sound odd to some to contend that modern food systems minimize waste. Most of the 
wastefulness that is observed in food retailers is a function of the scale of these operations, the 
high cost of labor, and the low cost of individual food items (Bellemare et al. 2017). The push 
towards lean and responsive supply chains allows firms to be more competitive because they can 
mandate uniformity in their supply of animals, and increase the flexibility of their supply lines, 
cutting down on waste (Martinez 1999; Martinez 2002; Taylor 2006; Mena et al. 2014).  This 
counter-intuitive result is closely related to the debate surrounding the environmental sustainability 
of “local” food markets, where some have argued that “local” is often less sustainable (Mariola 
2008; Coley et al. 2009; McWilliams 2010, chap. 1). For the purposes of this paper, it is enough 
to note that firms have every incentive to order the right amount of food to meet customer demand, 
and will reduce waste whenever it is profitable to do so.  
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that the information going down the supply chain is less precise. As Chickens R Us is managing 
their supply of chickens in the distribution network, they are also managing the rate at which they 
send contracts of birds to their “growers” and the number of growers that get contracts. While not 
every purchase will trigger a production change, there will be some drop in demand that results in 
a firm hatching one cohort fewer chicks, one shipment fewer chickens, and one less grower 
contract. 
 Alternatively, in less integrated markets, the relationship could easily be adjudicated by 
price changes, where distributors purchase meat, on demand, from auction at the rate they need to 
keep up with sales which are being closely tracked. A drop in sales will have some probability of 
dropping the price of beef by one cent, which will influence the auction price of cows, and will 
influence current herd sizes and the decisions by current ranchers about whether to leave the 
industry. 
 Mathematically and conceptually, this still leaves the argument close to where Singer and 
Kagan started: if there is some probability (1/n) that any given purchase will occur on a threshold, 
then the threshold action will trigger a reduction in production of around n units, yielding an 
expected impact equal to 1. Even the argument that lower prices will draw additional consumers 
is not likely in the long run. Because farmers have no price-setting power over agricultural markets, 
the price will always be determined by the costs faced by the marginal producers. This means that 
almost all of the price variability, over the long run, will be determined by production costs, not 
demand. Correspondingly, there will be a close to 1-to-1 relationship between the purchase of a 
chicken and the expected impact on production.14 
                                                        
14 This argument corresponds to the observation that, over long time periods, supply should be 
very elastic. As is noted elsewhere (Just 2000; Sumner et al. 2011; Tomek and Kaiser 2014, 56), 
 
 
26 
The actual probability of being on a threshold is probably not relevant to the ethical 
evaluation of meat purchasing, but it can be estimated using some basic knowledge of current 
industry practice. In the poultry industry, the large “growers” of “broiler” chickens produce, on 
average, 329,000 chickens per year (The Pew Environment Group 2013b). If the finest adjustment 
that a chicken distributor can make is to delay a shipment of birds to the grower by one day, then 
that means the threshold size will be one day’s worth of birds for one farm. This number comes 
out close to 900 birds. As a result, it is likely that a consumer, when choosing to buy a chicken, 
has close to a 1/900 chance of being on the threshold, and if a consumer decision triggers the 
threshold event, the impact will be that 900 fewer chickens will be sold that year. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, it seems to us highly misleading to evaluate the 
moral importance of our consumption decisions as though their probable efficacy in respect to 
these thresholds is the main measure of their consequences for the supply chain.15 While the action 
in question might be triggered by a consumer choice on the threshold, actions away from the 
threshold still contribute. This is an important difference between consumer choices and voting. 
                                                        
this long-run elasticity of supply is difficult to measure, and so we don’t have accurate industry-
specific empirical studies to refer to. Even so, Sumner et. al. point toward good reasons for 
thinking this is true: (i) over even short periods of time (less than a year) integrators can cancel 
contracts with growers and (ii) resources used in animal agriculture have many alternative uses. 
The result is that economies of scale and returns to scale should be constant, and the long-run 
supply elastic (Sumner et al. 2011). See also the explanations on pages 54-56 and in chapter four 
of Tomek and Kaiser (2014). 
15 This argument expands on that of Norcross (2004, 233). 
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Once an election is decided, the votes cease to be effective. With consumer choices, however, a 
consumer choice has a lasting impact on inventories even if the consumer action was not a 
threshold-crossing decision. The standard way of thinking about this question assumes a kind of 
static economy in which a consumer choice either has an immediate impact or no impact. In fact, 
supply chains are dynamic, meaning that there can be across-time effects that are harder to observe, 
but just as real. The practice of discussing consumer impact in terms of these thresholds makes the 
individual contribution to production decisions overly complicated, and puts an arbitrary emphasis 
on the threshold-crossing decision, when in fact there is a similar contributory impact of those 
decisions away from the threshold. 
To illustrate this point, let’s return to the grocer and the chicken purchase. A choice to not 
buy a chicken might not prevent the grocer from ordering more chickens that day, if the person is 
not on the threshold. But when the grocer orders, they will still have one additional chicken in 
inventory, which may impact their next ordering decision, or the one after. This is to say that all 
consumer actions contribute to some future threshold crossing. In contrast, votes cannot be counted 
toward future elections.  
 Finally, it is worth considering feedback-mechanisms in the economy that might mitigate 
or amplify the impact of a consumer choice. While these do not directly relate to the single-
decision impact arguments noted earlier, they contribute to our broader argument that consumers 
can have confidence that their choices are difference-making. First, there is one obvious mitigating 
feedback mechanism that has already been mentioned: when consumers purchase less meat, they 
will drive down the price of meat, which will encourage other customers to buy more.16 For reasons 
described earlier, this is a likely impact in the short run, but over the long-run, because of low 
                                                        
16 Both Budolfson and Martin make this argument in some form. 
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profit margins for farmers, this cannot have a sustained effect. So while the immediate response to 
a loss in demand will be lower prices for already-existing meat products, the long-run impact of 
those lower prices will be lower production (Tomek and Kaiser 2014).  
We also suggest that there are likely to be substantial positive feedback mechanisms. In 
brief, there are at least three reasons to expect an amplified response to the choice to become a 
vegetarian, which we will call the supply chain effect, the network effect, and the scale effect 
(McMullen 2016).  
The Supply Chain Effect: First, it is worth noting that a decrease in the number of animals 
killed means that fewer animals are needed for breeding purposes, and in the case of fish, fewer 
fish are needed as fish food. While the number of such animals varies by industry, one estimate 
indicated that 16% of laying hens produced eggs not for consumption but for hatcheries to produce 
chickens (Harish 2014). This means that eating less meat affects not just the animals directly killed 
for food, but also the animals exploited and displaced throughout the supply chain. For 
consequentialists who care about animal lives, this gives additional reason to abstain. 
 The Network Effect: Additionally, our actions have impacts on other consumers. Each 
decision to abstain from meat sends a signal to grocery stores and restaurants to provide more 
vegetarian food options. This in turn makes it easier for other people to make the same choice, 
because those foods are more readily available. As an example, consider the market for tofu, which 
is widely available in most markets, but still difficult to find in some areas. Where it is available, 
the selection is sometimes poor, and the price high. As more people buy tofu, however, it becomes 
cheaper to distribute and competition pushes down the price. Grocery stores will stock more 
varieties and place it more prominently in their displays. If there is a critical mass of local 
vegetarians, restaurants will be sure to include suitable options on their menus. Case studies have 
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shown that, producers make choices about marketing and space in response to consumer actions 
(Moretti 2010). 
 Moreover, even apart from considerations of marketing and product availability, there is 
substantial evidence that there are social effects of consumption decisions that will, in aggregate, 
multiply the effect of individual choices. Social scientists have identified mechanisms through 
which conspicuous or visible consumption choices influence the choices of peers (Grinblatt et al. 
2008). These effects are especially pronounced for choices where consumers are uncertain, and 
thus make consumption decisions by “following” peers (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). 
This “network effect” thus refers to all of the ways in which our consumption choices have 
spillover effects on other consumers. Conformity is economical, and so early vegetarians actually 
make it easier for others to follow in their footsteps. 
 The Scale Effect: Finally, closely related to the “network” effect is the impact of 
economies of scale. Part of the reason that meat is inexpensive is that the production and 
distribution is done at a large enough scale that costs are kept down. Many meat alternatives, 
however, have high prices because their customer base is small. Average production costs will 
decrease as these industries grow, making meat alternatives more competitive with meat. 
Similarly, innovation efforts have been directed for years toward making meat production 
efficient, whereas it is only very recently that significant research and development investments 
have been put into making scalable, sustainable, and delicious plant-based meat alternatives.17 This 
                                                        
17 For more information on innovative companies that are disrupting the traditional landscape of 
meat production, visit The Good Food Institute online at http://www.gfi.org (accessed on July 1, 
2016).  For more information on how these companies are raising start-up capital, visit New Crop 
Capital online at http://www.newcropcapital.com (accessed on July 1, 2016). 
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investment is possible only when the market for these alternative foods gets large enough to 
warrant new product development (McMullen 2016). 
 Though many may share the intuition that the economy is too large and complex for one 
consumer to have a real effect on the lives of animals, or that the probability of having an effect is 
just too small,18 we believe that these conclusions are not warranted by the way animal agricultural 
supply chains actually work. The intuition behind consequentialist inefficacy arguments depends 
on the impact of an individual action being qualitatively different (not just smaller) than the impact 
of larger aggregate decisions. We argue that there is a real qualitative continuity between the 
impact of an individual choice and the impact of aggregate choices. The difference between the 
individual and the aggregate effect is only a matter of probability and scale. Thus, individual 
consumers do have a real impact, though the impact associated with any particular purchase will 
always be uncertain and difficult to observe. It appears then, that there is a real sense in which 
consumers have a “vote” in favor of a particular system with each dollar that they spend. 
  Some of the literature we reference attempts to make a broad, generalizable point about 
collective action problems, or to make the case for collective political action instead of individual 
action in the marketplace. We find these conversations interesting and important and do not want 
to imply any kind of preference for or against action in the market instead of other kinds of 
activism. The aims of this paper are more modest. It is certainly possible to imagine an economic 
system in which consumers do not have the power or responsibility described here. Moreover, 
there may be real differences between the case of meat purchases and other problematic choices 
highlighted in the literature. Nevertheless, the logic of this argument will be of broad interest to 
                                                        
18 This seems to be the position espoused by Chignell (2015). 
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those studying ethical decision-making in the economy, which extends well beyond the area of 
animal ethics.19  
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